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Abstract
We investigate the impact that two German energy reforms—phase-out of nuclear
power plants after the Fukushima incident and expansion of renewables due to fixed
feed-in tariffs—had on neighbouring countries’ consumers. The unilateral German
reforms generated substantial negative and positive impacts, respectively, in neigh-
bouring countries with the highest overall effect of German policy found in France,
not Germany; an annual negative impact on consumers of e3.15 billion. We also find
significant differences in market integration between neighbouring countries by cal-
culating ratios between the estimated policy decisions’ impacts before and after
controlling for interconnector congestion.
JEL classifications: F14, F15, Q41, Q48, L94, L98.
Our vision is of an integrated continent-wide energy system where energy flows freely across
borders, based on competition and the best possible use of resources, and with effective regula-
tion of energy markets at EU level where necessary. (European Commission, 2015, A
Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change
Policy, Brussels1)
1 Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of Regions and the European Investment
Bank. A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change
Policy. COM (2015) 80 final, February 2015, p. 2.
VC Oxford University Press 2018.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
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1. Introduction
Cross-border trade in electricity is growing rapidly, albeit from a low base compared with
other energy sources (Oseni and Pollitt, 2014). The Western European interconnector sys-
tem is a leading example, benefiting from a strong push provided by the three Energy
Directives, plus Swiss cooperation. International trade of electricity in OECD Europe
reached around 10% of gross production in 2011 (Baritaud and Volk, 2014, Fig. 42). As
with other forms of trade, there are clear benefits in aggregate: Booz and Company et al.
(2013) estimate the gross welfare benefits from cross-border trade in Europe will eventually
amount to an average of e6.7/MWh. At the same time, trade in electricity leads to tensions
between national energy policies and wider European effects.
In this context, our paper examines the monetary impact on its neighbours of two recent
reforms in the German market, Europe’s biggest power market and one with significant im-
ports and exports of electrical power. These are the nuclear shutdown response to the
Fukushima earthquake and the contemporaneous expansion of renewables. We find that
both unilateral reforms had substantial—opposing—impacts on market prices in neigh-
bouring countries. While the nuclear phase-out triggered price increases of up to 25%, the
price reductions caused by Germany’s renewable energy support schemes were up to
0.16% for each percentage point of additional generation from German renewables.
Furthermore, we construct a counterfactual that enables causal inference of the degree
of market integration by capturing the impact of cross-border congestion. Germany’s
neighbouring countries exhibit large differences in this respect. Our empirical findings em-
phasize the need for increased efforts to harmonize national energy policies—especially
against the background of renewable energy and climate targets in general—with relevance
beyond the European Union.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the benefits and current ex-
tent of electricity market integration in the European Union. Section 3 then characterizes
the interplay between market integration processes and unilateral policy reforms and covers
the German unilateral policy decisions. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis, subdi-
vided into the description of the data set, the development of our empirical approach as
well as detailed discussion of our estimation results. Section 5 concludes the paper with a
summary of the main insights and a discussion of policy conclusions.
2. The benefits of electricity market integration in the European Union
European energy policy is undergoing a lengthy (and ongoing) integration process. Initially,
national electricity markets were heavily regulated, state-supported monopolies that first
needed to be liberalized and harmonized before a serious integration process could com-
mence (see generally Serralles, 2006).
A key driver is the European Union’s expectation of clearly positive welfare effects asso-
ciated with development of the respective market integration processes. As Antweiler
(2016) explains, although electricity is in one sense homogeneous, given differing demand
patterns and generation techniques, cross-border trade should be manifest in bi-directional
flows which take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. Following, for example, Domanico
(2007) or Serralles (2006), this is believed to have four potential impacts.
First, it should increase competition, thereby pushing the respective providers towards
cost reductions and/or productivity increases through innovation. More efficient utilization
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of existing generation and network capacities should lower electricity prices for customers.
Second, a given security of supply level can be guaranteed with reduced spare capacities, es-
sentially because an interconnected internal market makes it easier to balance fluctuations
in demand in a particular country. Third, this balancing effect is becoming increasingly im-
portant with the increasing desire for environmental protection exhibited through expan-
sion of intermittent wind and solar energy. Fourth, these (interrelated) beneficial effects of
an internal electricity market arguably enhance the overall competitiveness of the European
Union’s energy intensive industries by contributing affordable, secure and sustainable en-
ergy supply.
The benefits of electricity market integration—alongside assessments of its current
degree—have been the focus of several prior studies. In a detailed survey of integration
benefits, Booz & Company et al. (2013) subdivide the existing literature into studies esti-
mating the benefits of: (1) full market integration; (2) market coupling;2 and (3) market lib-
eralization.3 In the first category, Neuhoff et al. (2013) quantify the effect of further
integration of mainland-European electricity markets and the benefits from the utilization
of additional wind capacity.4 In the second, Newbery et al. (2015) estimate the potential
EU benefit of coupling interconnectors to increase efficiency of trans-border trading. In the
(more specific) literature aimed at identifying the degree of market integration, several stud-
ies apply pairwise price tests such as price ratios, correlations and co-integration analysis
and typically find an increase in integration over time. Examples include Robinson (2007),
Zachmann (2008), Mjelde and Bessler (2009), and Nitsche et al. (2010).
De Menezes and Houllier (2015) analyse whether price volatility and market integration
has changed across EU electricity markets after the German nuclear phase-out through cor-
relation and co-integration analyses. Bo¨ckers and Heimeshoff (2014) study the convergence
process of European wholesale electricity markets using national bank holidays as exogen-
ous demand shocks across their two subsamples 2004–2008 and 2008–2014. They estimate
a reduced form and consider demand dynamics indirectly through calendar dummies.
However, they do not identify the actual degree of integration, nor do they make compari-
son with a full integration counterfactual. In this paper, we apply a novel approach to esti-
mate such counterfactual prices, which enables us to compute a measure for the degree of
market integration.
3. Market integration and unilateral policy reforms
Although there is no doubt that measures increasing integration of European electricity
markets are likely to create substantial societal benefits, they also increase the potential im-
pact of unilateral policy reforms on neighbouring countries; spot prices for electricity in
one country become increasingly dependent on other single Member States’ actions. These
can result in negative impacts, which might raise policy discussions or even storms of pro-
test (in the worst case damaging the idea of Europe).
Furthermore, such negative impacts are likely to go beyond short-term price increases to
impacts on medium- and long-term investment decisions, even resulting in failures of na-
tional energy policies. For example, German government subsidies for renewable energies
2 See, for example, De Jong et al. (2007) and Kristiansen (2007a, 2007b).
3 See, for example, Pollitt (2009a, 2009b, 2012).
4 Other contributions include Leuthold et al. (2005), Green (2007), and Pellini (2014).
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together with the improved interconnection of the German-Austrian and French markets
may have a knock-on effect on, for example, the profitability of a proposed French invest-
ment in construction of a thermal power plant. Indeed, there are already discussions
on mechanisms to reduce interconnection aiming at protecting national electricity mar-
kets from externalities through unilateral neighbours’ policies, i.e. ‘grid-locks’ between
Germany and Poland (see Puka and Szulecki, 2014).
In this context, we analyse empirically the impacts of two distinct unilateral German
policy reforms: the phase-out of nuclear power plants after the Fukushima incident in
March 2011 and promotion of renewables that started in 2000 and was since reformed sev-
eral times. Clearly, there are differences. First, while the nuclear phase-out was a single,
sudden, unilateral decision with no comparators in other European countries, most
European countries promote renewables and many have revised their policies over time.
Second, we expect opposing impacts of the two policy reforms. Whilst removing a
substantial fraction of nuclear power is likely to increase spot prices (provided that cross-
border capacities are available and sufficiently large), promoting renewable energy pro-
duction is likely to create a downward trend on price, since renewable generation at zero
marginal costs reduces the residual demand on conventional generation (the so called
‘merit-order effect’).
We investigate not only whether the two unilateral reforms caused the expected effects,
but also quantify them in terms of percentage price changes in neighbouring countries aris-
ing from Germany’s unilateral policy reforms.
3.1 Nuclear phase-out in Germany
The events of Fukushima in March 2011 marked a complete switch in Germany from a
2010 policy favourable to nuclear power to a sudden decision to shut-off all the six active
nuclear power plants opened before 1981. This was an event of some significance: 6.3 GW
of capacity, around 7% of installed conventional capacity and 12% of average German
load, was permanently removed from the system, with significant impacts on nuclear plant
output, as indicated in Fig. 1.
Naturally, the removal of a significant fraction of generation capacity is expected to
cause price increases on the spot and future markets. In particular, nuclear capacity pro-
vides a base-load power source, consistently generating at low marginal costs to satisfy
minimum demand. Removing a significant fraction of this capacity forces a switch to more
expensive (lignite, hard coal or gas-fired) power plants—located nearer to the right-hand
side of the supply-cost curve (merit order)—in order to meet demand (e.g. Knopf et al.,
2014). The existing literature on the (price) effects of nuclear power plant closures confirms
the general argument.5
5 Using a dummy variable approach, Grossi et al. (2017) investigate the impact of the phase-out on
the German market itself. They find prices in Germany have increased—most significantly in hours
of low demand (caused by a shift in the merit order), with only a small price increase in hours of
high demand (caused by increased market power). Davis and Hausman (2016), in a related exercise
with some parallels, find comparable price effects of an unexpected nuclear power plant closure
in California. Using a semi-parametric regression approach to identify the marginal generation unit
each time-period before and after the event, they found the closure created binding transmission
constraints, causing short-run inefficiencies and potentially making it more profitable for certain
plants to act non-competitively.
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3.2 Promotion of renewables in Germany and neighbouring countries
Germany had actively promoted the growth of renewable energy production long before
Fukushima by implementing three basic principles: (1) investment protection through guar-
anteed feed-in tariffs for 20 years, with unlimited priority feed-in to the grid and connection
requirements imposed on the system operator; (2) subsidies paid not by taxes but by domes-
tic consumers as an Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG) surcharge included in the electri-
city bill;6 and (3) feed-in tariffs for new renewable plants, decreasing at regular intervals to
create cost pressures (and innovation incentives) on renewable energy companies.
Although the EEG was successful in making Germany a world pioneer in renewable en-
ergy from wind and especially solar sources7 (Joskow, 2011; Borenstein, 2012), renewable
capacity—as noted by Grossi et al. (2017)—is utilizable nowhere near as intensively as con-
ventional sources, and due to its stochastic nature is not ‘biddable’ according to electricity
demand in the same way as coal, gas and pumped hydro plants are (Joskow, 2011). While
an average thermal plant in practice provides around 50% of its total theoretical capacity
over a year, wind hovers around 20% and photovoltaic only around 11%.
We should highlight the difference between the nuclear phase-out and the expansion of
generation from renewable sources. Whilst the nuclear phase-out is a single natural experi-
ment in that it was un-planned, the increase of renewable generation capacity is a multi-
year programme benefiting owners of renewable plants with priority feed-in to the grid and
Fig. 1. Generation from German nuclear power plants before and after the nuclear phase-out.
Note: The dashed vertical reference line indicates the time of permanent closure of the 6.3 GW taken
offline in March 2011 directly after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear incident. An additional temporary
drop in generation capacity from nuclear sources—to a minimum marginally above 5 GW—in
May and June 2011 was caused by obligatory security checks of the remaining nuclear plants.
Source: Grossi et al. (2017).
6 In 2014, the EEG surcharge was 6.24 ct/kWh. However, energy intensive industries are widely ex-
empted from paying the surcharge.
7 Capacity in these areas has been growing rapidly, boosted by EEG support. According to the
German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (2014), in late 2011, wind capacity reached al-
most 30GW with photovoltaic power capacity at about 25GW (out of a total system listed capacity
of 175GW). In sum, in the year 2011, more capacity had been added through renewables (wind:
1.9GW; solar: 7.5GW) than had been removed by the nuclear phase-out.
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fixed feed-in-tariffs for a period of 20 years, hence rendering renewable generation exogen-
ous. Generation from renewables creates permanent supply shocks for conventional power
plant owners. Importantly—by contrast with the nuclear phase-out—promotion of renew-
able energy production was also introduced (and incrementally extended) in Germany’s
neighbouring countries.8 Figure 2 plots the respective country shares of intermittent renew-
able energy in gross final energy consumption between 2010 and 2012. Denmark and
Germany-Austria are the ‘intermittent variable renewable leaders’ with shares reaching (on
average) 25% and 15%, respectively, in 2012. France, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic
and Poland lag far behind, with shares around 5%. The intermittent nature of generation
from wind and solar is evident in the figure (see also Grossi et al., 2017) and means that
controls for these effects are necessary in isolating the impact of the German reforms on the
respective spot prices.
The impact of German unilateral energy policy reforms on market prices also allows a
trade theory interpretation9 in terms of studying the welfare effects of policy measures such
as tariffs/taxes or subsidies on consumers and producers in the trading partners’ countries
as well as the originator. For example, a tariff or subsidy can improve the terms of trade of
the (large) originating country while imposing a negative impact on social welfare on the
trading partners (see, for example, Krugman et al., 2014).
Here, an application of basic trade theory would suggest that Germany—if it reduces
the price of its imports by expanding renewables—could improve its welfare (with the over-
all net effect on welfare being dependent on the size of the ‘renewables subsidy’). Yet,
Fig. 2. Share of intermittent renewable energy in total electricity generation.
Note: Legend is ordered from highest to lowest shares of renewable energy generation in total energy
generation. Renewables include wind and solar. Switzerland excluded due to negligibly small intermit-
tent renewables.
Source: Authors’ calculations from official country data.
8 It should be noted that we control for the simultaneous generation from renewables in the neigh-
bouring countries in all regressions and thus capture parallel developments therein.
9 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting a discussion in light of (strategic) trade
theory.
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assuming the loss of nuclear capacity raises the relative price of imports from neighbouring
countries, a countervailing decrease in its welfare would result. For the trading partners,
Germany’s renewable subsidy is expected to increase net welfare due to lower import prices
whilst the nuclear reduction likely has the opposite effect.10
However, it is important to recall a distinctive feature: Germany as the originating state
was not aiming at increasing short-run welfare at the expense of the trading partners
through an application of standard ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies known from strategic
trade theory (see, for example, Brander and Spencer, 1985), but had in mind longer-run en-
vironmental goals. While different in motivation, the effects on the trading partners can be
quite similar (i.e. they either profit or suffer from the unilateral German decisions).
We study the existence and size of the effects on market prices empirically below.
4. Empirical analysis
How significantly are neighbouring countries affected by Germany’s unilateral policy deci-
sions? In a highly integrated market, both actions—the sudden nuclear phase-out and the
expansion of renewables through support schemes—may be expected to cause substantial
knock-on effects, while if the country is not integrated at all with Germany, we would ex-
pect zero impact. By combining this with information on import and export cross-border
congestion, the degree of market integration can be measured. More significantly, however,
the degree of interdependence raises the question of whether the project of integrating
European energy markets is in danger if unilateral decisions of certain Member States have
substantial effects on medium- and long-term investment decisions in neighbouring coun-
tries as well as on short-term prices.
We provide an empirical assessment of the impacts of the two unilateral energy policy
reforms in Germany on wholesale electricity prices in its directly connected neighbours: the
Netherlands, France, Poland, the Czech Republic, Switzerland and Denmark (West and
East). Spain is used in a placebo test since, being unconnected directly or indirectly with
Germany, it would not be expected to be affected by either change.11 Section 4.1 describes
the construction of the data set and presents descriptive statistics, Section 4.2 describes our
modelling approach. The estimation results are in Section 4.3.
4.1 Data set and descriptive statistics
We collected and merged data from several sources over the calendar years 2010 to 2012 to
create the rich, unique data set used for our empirical analysis. Our dependent variables are
country-specific wholesale (spot) day-ahead prices obtained from the respective power ex-
changes: EPEX Spot for Germany-Austria, France and Switzerland, Elspot for the two
10 Specifically, while producers in the trading partners’ countries are expected to increase profits
due to less cheap nuclear plants in Germany, the respective consumers are likely to face reduc-
tions in consumer surplus due to higher market prices.
11 German and Austrian markets are fully integrated and therefore considered as a single market.
Although Germany and Belgium are neighbouring countries, they currently are connected only
through loop flows. However, according to Jaure´guy-Naudin (2012), the TSOs of the two countries
were considering the construction of an HVDC line with a capacity of 1000 MW. Furthermore, the
existing (small) interconnector between Germany and Sweden is excluded due to data unavail-
ability. Spain’s interconnector with France is very limited.
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Danish zones (West and East), PXE for the Czech Republic, PPX for Poland and APX for
the Netherlands. All price series are collected on an hourly basis, but transformed into daily
averages, in order to maintain analytical tractability.
Our independent variables are of two broad types. Starting with the individual vari-
ables, hourly data on observed load in each country was obtained from European network
of transmission system operators for electricity (ENTSO-E), while information on hourly
forecasted generation from the intermittent renewables wind and solar (for each country)
comes from the commercial data provider Eurowind GmbH. To control for cross-border
congestion, we have collected hourly data on the import and export interconnectors avail-
able for trade (Available Transfer Capacities [ATC]). This comes partly from the respective
transmission system operators (TSOs) TransnetBW, 50 Hertz, Amprion (all three
Germany), TenneT (Germany and the Netherlands), RTE (France), Energienet.dk
(Denmark), CEPS (Czech Republic), PSE (Poland) and SwissGrid (Switzerland) and
partly—due to changes in the responsibility for the allocation of interconnector capacity—
from the Auction Offices CAO (for the Central Western Europe (CWE) area) and CASC
(for the Central Eastern Europe [CEE] area). We use this to calculate daily import and ex-
port congestion indices, defined as the percentage of hours of a day over which the respect-
ive interconnectors were congested. Congestion prevents further trans-border trade that
would otherwise continue until prices equalize and arbitrage possibilities vanish. As com-
mon variables, we include monthly European hard coal and natural gas price indices (base
year 2005)—obtained from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany—and an EU ETS car-
bon emission price index (which was downloaded from Thomson Reuters Datastream).
Since load is likely endogenous, we instrument for it in our econometric analysis below.
Our instruments for load are the current level of area-specific air temperatures in each
country and their squares. Data on daily air temperatures in many cities in Germany and its
neighbouring countries have been downloaded from Mathematica 9 (WeatherData and
CityData). This data constitutes the basis for the calculation of population-weighted tem-
perature indices.12 The descriptive statistics for the resulting data set are reported in
Table 1 and subsequently discussed selectively.
Table 1 shows some variation in the spot prices for electricity (expressed in Euro per
MWh) between Germany and its neighbouring countries. As electricity is a homogeneous
good, not trivial price differences indicate imperfectly integrated markets. In fact, spot pri-
ces are found in a range from Denmark (West) with an average price of e43.59 up to
Switzerland showing an average price of e52.27, i.e. about a 19.9 % higher price.13 A sum-
mary on average absolute price differences between the German-Austrian market and its
neighbours is presented in Table 2, showing that the price difference is highest with Poland
and lowest with the Netherlands and Czech Republic.
Information on renewables in the form of electricity production through either wind or
solar is limited to countries with an appreciable share of renewables.14 In particular solar is
12 To avoid problems of quadratic transformation, the temperature indices are converted into degrees
Fahrenheit, which always take positive values within our data. Source: Authors’ calculations.
13 Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests clearly reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the under-
lying price and load series; test statistics reported in Table A.2 in the online Appendix.
14 Unfortunately, we do not observe Scandinavian reservoir levels which would also be relevant, in
particular we would expect them to have an effect on electricity prices in Denmark. Nordpool
publishes such data but only since 2015.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
DE-AT FR NL CH DKE DKW PL CZ ES
Dependent Variable
Price (Euro/MWh) 46.09 47.81 48.49 52.27 47.97 43.59 45.87 45.58 44.76
(16.00) (25.46) (13.75) (17.34) (35.23) (15.03) (9.93) (15.91) (15.53)
Individual Variables
Load (GWh) 62.31 56.21 12.51 5.66 1.55 2.30 16.49 7.20 29.20
(11.43) (12.92) (2.39) (1.10) (035) (0.52) (2.79) (1.25) (3.13)
Wind (GWh) 4.97 1.10 0.53 – 0.89 0.89 0.31 0.03 4.25
(4.12) (0.95) (0.47) – (0.78) (0.78) (0.30) (0.03) (2.37)
Solar (GWh) 2.20 0.27 – – – – – 0.23 0.77
(3.61) (0.45) – – – – – (0.40) (0.28)
Import ATC (GW) 12.10 2.19 2.51 4.34 0.52 0.90 0.53 1.11 –
(1.03) (0.58) (0.38) (0.24) (0.16) (0.44) (0.29) (0.53)
Export ATC (GW) 6.75 2.61 2.12 0.69 0.50 0.81 0.24 2.21 –
(0.90) (0.60) (0.39) (0.23) (0.20) (0.28) (0.24) (0.46)
Import Congestion
Index (0-1)
0.22 0.18 0.10 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.48 0.42 –
(0.25) (0.38) (0.31) (0.42) (0.45) (0.47) (0.50) (0.49)
Export Congestion
Index (0-1)
0.31 0.28 0.30 0.62 0.23 0.13 0.43 0.38 –
(0.29) (0.45) (0.46) (0.48) (0.42) (0.34) (0.50) (0.49)
Common Variables
Gas Price Index 164.85 164.85 164.85 164.85 164.85 164.85 164.85 164.85 164.85
(22.85) (22.85) (22.85) (22.85) (22.85) (22.85) (22.85) (22.85) (22.85)
Coal Price Index 174.66 174.66 174.66 174.66 174.66 174.66 174.66 174.66 174.66
(9.98) (9.98) (9.98) (9.98) (9.98) (9.98) (9.98) (9.98) (9.98)
Carbon Price Index 8.40 8.40 8.40 8.40 8.40 8.40 8.40 8.40 8.40
(4.16) (4.16) (4.16) (4.16) (4.16) (4.16) (4.16) (4.16) (4.16)
Instrument for Load
Temperature (C) 9.83 12.71 10.30 10.30 8.32 8.59 8.83 9.41 17.16
(8.00) (6.61) (6.26) (7.61) (7.03) (7.20) (8.99) (8.62) (6.40)
Notes: Descriptive statistics show means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the utilized data; ‘Import’
and ‘Export’ variables always represent flow direction from the German perspective. For countries with miss-
ing values for solar and/or wind generation, the respective values were too low to be measured. For countries
outside the European Currency Union, daily exchange rates from Thomson Reuters are used for the transform-
ation. Though Spain has no interconnection with Germany we include it for the application of a placebo test.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 2. Average price differences between the German-Austrian market and its interconnected
neighbours
Germany-Austria and FR NL CH DKE DKW PL CZ
Average price difference in Euro/MWh 4.9 3.3 8.2 8.3 5.2 9.5 4.2
Standard Deviation of price differences 20.4 8.2 10.4 31.4 8.6 10.7 5.5
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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largely confined to a subset. Germany-Austria has by far the largest amount in both catego-
ries (4.97 GWh and 2.20 GWh), but small compared to total load.
Germany has by far the largest import and export capacities available for trade (ATC)
in both categories. However, surprisingly because Germany is a net exporter, interconnec-
tor capacities for export are roughly half the size of import capacities. This is mainly be-
cause interconnector capacity from Switzerland to Germany is around five times higher
than in the opposite direction. The derived import and export congestion indices—defined
as the proportion of hours of the day at which the respective interconnectors were con-
gested (thereby hindering further trans-border trade)—reveal that, in terms of imports, con-
gestion appears to be a minor issue for the Netherlands (10%) while the opposite is true for
Poland (48%). For exports, the spectrum includes 13% in the case of Denmark (West) and
62% for Switzerland.15
The congestion variables for Germany incorporate all congestions and cross-border
capacities Germany shares with its interconnected neighbouring countries, while for
Germany’s neighbours only their interconnection with Germany is relevant. They are con-
structed as follows: first, we interact the hourly congestion dummies in each country with the
transfer capacity available for trade in the respective hour (ATC) and build the hourly sum
over all countries. Second, we divide the hourly sum by the sum of ATCs in all countries in
the respective hours (also including all ATC from uncongested interconnectors), formally:
Cong
impðexpÞ
t ¼
PK
i;t DC
impðexpÞ
i;t  ATCimpðexpÞi;tPK
i;t ATC
impðexpÞ
i;t
with Cong
impðexpÞ
t representing the congestion variable for Germany for imports and ex-
ports, respectively. DC
impðexpÞ
i;t is a dummy indicating the existence of import (export) con-
gestion in country i and hour t while ATC
impðexpÞ
i;t describes the respective import (export)
ATCs between neighbour i and Germany in hour t. Finally, we compute daily averages
from the hourly import and export congestion indices.
However, our congestion index variables cannot be interpreted as direct measures for
the degrees of integration. For example, price differences can occur even if interconnector
capacity is not fully utilized (depending on the allocation mode of interconnector capacity).
Particularly in explicit auctions—as used between Germany and Switzerland, Poland and
the Czech Republic—expectation errors of electricity traders can cause such price differ-
ences (despite some interconnector capacity being available).16 Furthermore, congestion
price differences can differ significantly between countries. For instance, when congested,
the price difference between Germany and the Czech Republic is, on average, e5.13/MWh,
while it is, on average, e15.96/MWh when the interconnector between Denmark East and
Germany is congested because Danish electricity generation (and thus its price) is much
more intermittent due to their high wind share of generation reflected in Fig. 2. Also, as
was shown above in Table 1, while the interconnectors between Germany and the Czech
Republic are congested in 42% (imports) and 38% (exports) of the time, the average
15 We define congestion as the existence of a price difference between Germany and a certain
neighbour in a certain hour.
16 In our empirical analysis below, we exclude such cases by assuming a state of congestion only
as soon as the price difference exceeds e1/MWh. Our results are also found to be robust to price
differences of 1%, 5% and 10 % or e0/MWh.
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absolute price difference between Czech and German-Austrian prices is only e4.2/MWh)
while it is on average e4.9/MWh between France and Germany where interconnectors suf-
fer less frequent congestion (18% import and 28% export congestions). The same is
observed when price correlations are considered. For instance, French prices are less corre-
lated with German-Austrian prices than Czech prices, despite the fact that Czech intercon-
nectors with Germany are more frequently congested than French interconnectors with
Germany.17 Thus, average of price differences and the frequency of congestions are not ne-
cessarily related.
We further assume interconnector capacities are exogenous in the short run and unaffected
by the nuclear outage. Interconnector capacity expansion is a long-term matter and variation
in the transfer capacity is based on technical calculations according to the ENTSO-E method,
reflecting the physical realities of the grid adjusted (varying) security margin. We also assume
national fuel-fired generation capacities are exogenous and unaffected in the short-term and
generation from renewables is particularly exogenous due to fixed feed-in tariffs and quota ob-
ligations provided through national renewable support schemes.18 Nevertheless, we instru-
ment for the congestion variables later due to simultaneity with prices.
4.2 Empirical approach
Our empirical approach is subdivided into two parts. First, we estimate the impact of
unilateral German policy decisions—the nuclear phase-out and the recent expansion of re-
newables resulting from national support schemes—on prices in its (interconnected) neigh-
bouring countries and the German-Austrian market itself. As both the nuclear phase-out
and generation from renewables are exogenous, our study has a quasi-experimental charac-
ter. Second, we additionally control for the (price-increasing or price-decreasing) impact of
congested interconnectors through the inclusion of import and export congestion variables,
respectively, to estimate the impact the nuclear phase-out and renewable generation would
have had on the neighbouring markets absent cross-border congestions. The degree of mar-
ket integration is then calculated as the ratio between the estimated policy decisions’ im-
pacts before and after controlling for congestion. For instance, if we find that Germany’s
nuclear phase-out has caused a 10% price increase in one country before controlling for
congestion and 20% afterwards, we measure the degree of integration between these two
markets as 50%.
Technically, we estimate the following two equations (with all non-indicator variables
in logs):
Pi;t ¼ a1 þ b1iLi;t þ d1iNPOi;t þ #1iREi;t þ w1iXi;t þ r1iCali;t þ e1i;t (1)
and
Pi;t ¼ a2 þ b2iLi;t þ d2iNPOi;t þ #2iREi;t þ w2iXi;t þ r2iCali;t þ k2iCongi;t þ e2i;t (2)
where e1i;t  Nð0;r2e1 Þ, e2i;t  Nð0; r2e2 Þ, with Pi;t denoting average wholesale prices in coun-
try i at day t, Li;t representing load and X i;t being a vector of covariates including input
17 See Table A.1 in the online Appendix.
18 While most countries use some form of feed-in tariff, some decided to introduce quota obligations,
tenders, exemption from energy taxes or instruments as part of which a fraction of the revenue of
general energy taxes finance renewable energy sources. See Ragwitz et al. (2012) for a detailed
comparison of European renewable support schemes.
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price indices for hard coal and natural gas, carbon emission prices at time t and forecasted
generation from wind and solar in country i at time t. Cal is a vector of calendar variables
including weekday and month dummies. NPO and RE are our variables of interest rep-
resenting, respectively, the supply-side shock dummy variable resulting from the German
nuclear phase-out (NPO) in March 2011 and the electricity generation from intermittent
renewables (RE) wind and solar promoted by national support schemes. Equation (2)
only differs from eq. (1) by including the additional Cong vector containing the vari-
ables indicating the daily percentage of hourly import and export congestions. From
the parameters estimated in (1) and (2) the degree of integration (DoI) can be formalized
as DoINPOi 6¼DE AT ¼ d1id2i and DoIREi 6¼DE AT ¼
#1i
#2i
, respectively, for Germany’s neighbours and
DoINPODE AT ¼ d2id1i and DoIREi¼DE AT ¼
#2i
#1i
, respectively, for the German-Austrian market.
Given this basic set-up, correct identification of the impact of Germany’s energy policy
reforms on neighbouring countries crucially depends on an appropriate modelling of the
supply curve. Generally, endogeneity is likely to play a role due to the joint causality be-
tween electricity demand and supply.19 We therefore use instrumental variables (IV) and
employ national temperatures and their squares as excluded instruments.20 Hence, we have
the following first stage regressions:
Li;t ¼ a3 þ b3iInstri;t þ d3iNPOi;t þ #3iREi;t þ u3iXi;t þ r3iCali;t þ mi;t (3)
The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic always exceeds the weak identification (ID) critical
values from Stock-Yogo (see Appendix Tables A.4–A.11 in the Supplementary material)
which suggests that load is identified by the instruments. In the estimations which control
for cross-border congestions we also instrument for the congestion variables due to simul-
taneity with price. We use heteroscedasticity-based instruments as suggested by Lewbel
(2012).
We believe that endogeneity is not a major issue for the remaining variables since coal,
gas and emission certificates are traded supra-nationally and Germany only accounts for a
fraction of the trade.
As the shape of the supply curve is unknown and likely non-linear, we model it as flex-
ibly as possible by estimating a semiparametric partially linear regression model with
Robinson’s (1988) double residual method. Consider a partially linear regression model of
the type:
Pi ¼ h0 þ Zihþm Lið Þ þ gi with i ¼ 1; . . . :;N (4)
where Pi represents spot prices in country i, Zi is the row vector of control variables, and h0
is the intercept term. Variable Li represents load and enters in a non-linear way according
to a non-binding function m. gi is the disturbance, assumed to have E gjLð Þ ¼ 0, an
19 Although demand is often considered as perfectly inelastic, recent demand-side management
activities aim at reacting to price signals and therefore question the assumption of perfectly in-
elastic demand. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity will support this view later.
20 Temperature can be thought of as an instrument because hotter temperatures increase electricity
demand through the need for cooling, while colder temperatures require more electricity for heat-
ing purposes. The squared term captures a possible non-linear relation.
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assumption which we will later relax. The double residual methodology applies conditional
expectation on both sides leading to:
E PijLið Þ ¼ h0 þ E ZijLið Þhþm Lið Þ with i ¼ 1; . . . :;N (5)
And, through subtracting eq. (5) from eq. (4), we get:
Pi  E PijLið Þ ¼ Zi  E ZijLið Þð Þh þ gi with i ¼ 1; . . . :;N (6)
where Pi  E PijLið Þ ¼ g1i and Zki  E ZkijLið Þ ¼ g2ki reflect the residuals with k¼ 1, . . . , K
indexing the control variables entering the model parametrically. In a two-step proced-
ure we first obtain estimates of the conditional expectations En PijLið Þ and En ZijLið Þ
from some non-parametric (kernel) estimations of the form Pi ¼ mP Lið Þ þ g1i and
Zki ¼ mZk Lið Þ þ g2k. After inserting the estimated conditional expectations in eq. (6),
we estimate the parameter vector h consistently without explicitly modelling m Lið Þ
by a standard non-intercept ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and we obtain
bh ¼ bg 02bg2 1ðbg 02bg1Þ. Finally, mðLÞ is estimated by regressing P Zbh
 
on L non-
parametrically.
The endogenous nature of the non-parametrically modelled variable L, however, yields
E gLð Þ 6¼ 0. As standard IV-techniques such as 2SLS and general method of moments
(GMM) are not feasible in the context of endogenous variables that are non-linear in par-
ameters, we apply a two-step residual inclusion control function and add the residuals  fit-
ted in the linear prediction of L in eq. (3) as control function to the semi-parametric
regression model stated in eq. (6) (see Blundell and Powell, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009).
We next apply Hardle and Mammen’s (1993) specification test to assess whether the
nonparametric fit can be approximated by a parametric polynomial alternative. The specifi-
cation test is based on squared deviations between parametric and non-parametric regres-
sions. Critical values are obtained, simulating by wild bootstrap. The test results justify a
polynomial adjustment for load of order 2 for all countries (see Appendix Table A.2 in the
Supplementary material). This information on the supply curve enables us, in a second step,
to correctly model the shape of the supply curve parametrically through the inclusion of
squared load as a second endogenous variable and, in addition, to consider correlation be-
tween the disturbances across countries through the estimation of system-wide two-step
GMM. We instrument for the square of load with bL2, the square of the first stage predic-
tion of load from eq. (3). When the congestion variables are included we use Lewbel’s
(2012) heteroscedasticity-based instruments for them.
4.3 Estimation results
Table 3 presents our main estimation results. Columns (1) and (2) report the results of the
semiparametric estimation by Robinson’s (1988) method—excluding or including conges-
tions—and columns (3) and (4) report the results of the parametric estimation by two-step
IV GMM (see Appendix Tables A.4–A.11 in the Supplementary material for the respective
first-stage test statistics). Note that—in columns (1) and (2)—the reported coefficients stem
from 16 separate regressions (which we do not report for the sake of clarity and brevity21).
21 The full set of regression tables is available in Tables A.4 to A.11 of the online Appendix.
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Table 3. Estimation results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Semiparametric IV Semiparametric IV System IV GMM System IV GMM
Congestion
Control
NO YES NO YES
DE-AT
Phase-out 0.152*** (0.031) 0.123*** (0.038) 0.158*** (0.032) 0.110*** (0.003)
Renewables 0.185*** (0.014) 0.164*** (0.026) 0.206*** (0.020) 0.199*** (0.001)
FR
Phase-out 0.125*** (0.046) 0.177*** (0.042) 0.179*** (0.039) 0.232*** (0.003)
Renewables 0.083*** (0.014) 0.136*** (0.021) 0.072*** (0.014) 0.117*** (0.002)
NL
Phase-out 0.084** (0.034) 0.084** (0.038) 0.075** (0.035) 0.092** (0.002)
Renewables 0.061*** (0.013) 0.076*** (0.014) 0.067*** (0.016) 0.085*** (0.001)
CH
Phase-out 0.092** (0.035) 0.096** (0.036) 0.080** (0.035) 0.131*** (0.003)
Renewables 0.096*** (0.021) 0.116*** (0.028) 0.088*** (0.016) 0.132*** (0.001)
DK East
Phase-out 0.235*** (0.052) 0.291*** (0.052) 0.248*** (0.051) 0.276*** (0.004)
Renewables 0.101*** (0.032) 0.134*** (0.024) 0.090*** (0.027) 0.123*** (0.002)
DK West
Phase-out 0.110** (0.049) 0.153** (0.059) 0.089** (0.048) 0.102*** (0.004)
Renewables 0.157*** (0.033) 0.174*** (0.026) 0.150*** (0.021) 0.160*** (0.002)
PL
Phase-out 0.007 (0.037) 0.067** (0.036) 0.001 (0.034) 0.066** (0.002)
Renewables 0.013 (0.009) 0.068*** (0.014) 0.022** (0.010) 0.068*** (0.001)
CZ
Phase-out 0.186*** (0.040) 0.176*** (0.041) 0.198*** (0.034) 0.180*** (0.003)
Renewables 0.161*** (0.037) 0.196*** (0.048) 0.159*** (0.023) 0.179*** (0.002)
#Obs. 1095 1095 1095 1095
Note: The table reports the main results from 16 separate semiparametric regressions in columns (1) and (2)
and two regressions using system wide IV-GMM in columns (3) and (4). Parameters of phase-out are trans-
formed through (exp(b[Phase-Out] -1) to render them interpretable as percentage impact on prices. Standard
errors in parentheses; block bootstrap SE on weekly blocks for models (1) and (2), Newey-West HAC S.E. for
models (3) and (4). The semiparametric models (1) and (2) are estimated by the Robinson (1988) double re-
sidual estimator with load modelled non-parametrically; models (3) and (4) estimated through two-step GMM
with correlated disturbances; in models (1) and (2) we control for endogeneity of load through the inclusion of
the first stage residual as control function. Instruments for the first stage regressions in all equations are tem-
peratures in the respective countries and their squares; in models (3) and (4) squares of the first stage predic-
tions of load are included as additional instruments to approximate the nonparametric fit through a quadratic
function of load; in columns (2) and (4) we control for congestions and instrument for the congestion variables
using heteroscedasticity based instruments as suggested by Lewbel (2012); all covariates from eqs (1) and (2)
are included in the estimated models though not reported for the sake of clarity and brevity; the full set of re-
gression tables is available in the Supplementary material (Appendix Tables A.4–A.11); significance levels: *
0.05  p< 0.1 , ** 0.01  p< 0.05 , *** p< 0.01.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
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Comparing regression results between the Robinson estimator and two-step system IV
GMM, Table 3 shows very similar results in terms of both direction and size of the coeffi-
cients across the two estimation approaches.22 We therefore concentrate our further discus-
sion on the results from the system GMM model shown in columns (3) and (4) which, for
the reasons given above, arguably generates more efficient estimates.
Comparing the estimation results excluding congestion controls, the expected positive
impact of the nuclear phase-out on spot price is confirmed for all neighbouring countries
except Poland, while the promotion of renewables in Germany pushed prices down. The
nuclear phase-out caused large price increases in Germany-Austria itself (16%), but also in
its neighbouring countries France (18%), DK East (25%) and the Czech Republic (20%).
The promotion of renewables, however, led to price decreases particularly in Germany-
Austria (0.21% for a 1% increase in generation from renewables), Denmark West (0.15%)
and the Czech Republic (0.16%).
Turning to the results of our estimations including congestion controls, a comparison of
the respective values in columns (3) and (4) shows diverging results for coefficient magni-
tudes while their direction and general significance remain unaffected (again excepting
Poland). In particular, we find (absolute) size reductions for both unilateral decisions—
nuclear phase-out and promotion of renewables—for Germany-Austria indicating that a
higher degree of market integration would have reduced the impact of German reforms on
the German-Austrian market itself. Most expected neighbouring countries exhibit larger
(absolute) coefficients when controlling for congestions—the impact of Germany’s reforms
would have been higher if the markets were fully integrated.
Although the discussion of the empirical results of the two separate stages—excluding
and including congestion controls—has provided valuable insights on the price effects of
the two unilateral energy policy decisions of Germany, we ultimately want to use these re-
sults to derive a measure of the degree of market integration. In Table 4 above, we present
calculations of the ratio of the estimated policy decisions’ impacts before and after control-
ling for congestions.23
As Table 4 shows, the degree of market integration is mostly similar regardless
of whether we measure it for the nuclear phase-out or renewable generation—the
Table 4. Degree of market integration
DE-AT FR NL CH DKE DKW PL CZ
Phase-out Index 70% 77% 82% 61% 90% 87% 0% 100%
Renewable Index 97% 62% 79% 67% 73% 94% 32% 89%
Mean 83% 69% 80% 64% 82% 91% 16% 94%
Note: Degree of market integration is the ratio of the coefficients from the GMM estimates in Table 3 (capped
at 100%). In the case of Germany, the coefficient of phase-out and renewables, respectively from column (4) is
divided by the respective coefficient from column (3). For all neighbouring countries, the index is computed as
the ratio of (3) to (4). Mean refers to the mean value of both market integration indices. Coefficients insignifi-
cant at 10% are considered as zero.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
22 The only, minor, exception is Poland.
23 The computed integration indices are sursprisingly similar to the price correlations reported in
Table A.1 in the online Appendix.
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cross-country correlation24 between both types of measures is aroundþ0.81. We would ex-
pect it to be less than 100%, because the impact is felt differently across countries due to
their different circumstances.
Based on the mean of both measures, the Czech market (94%) is almost fully integrated
with the German-Austrian market with the Netherlands and Denmark somewhat less so.
By contrast, the lowest degree of market integration is found for Poland (16%).25 The
mean value of 83% for the German-Austrian market can be interpreted as the average de-
gree of integration of all neighbouring markets with the German-Austrian market.
In order to provide confidence that the effects we uncover are indeed associated with
interconnection, we employed the same estimation strategy for the Spanish electricity mar-
ket as a placebo test. Spain was chosen because it is not directly connected with Germany
but is similar in generation patterns. The indirect connection via France is also relatively
low. Thus, we assume that the impact of the German policy reforms on the Spanish market
should be negligible and finding significant effects of the German policies on the Spanish mar-
ket would suggest either that the Spanish market is more strongly connected with the
German-Austrian market or—which would be worse—that our estimates of the policy effects
reflect coincidental developments rather than the policy effects. However, the GMM esti-
mates show both German policy measures had insignificant impacts on Spanish electricity
prices. Details are given in Appendix Table A.12 (in the Supplementary material).
We close the section by providing some ballpark figures on the monetary effects of the
two German unilateral policy reforms on its neighbours. Table 5 quantifies the yearly wind-
fall negative and positive impacts on consumers as well as the respective (country-specific)
net effects of the two unilateral reforms.26
Based on the estimated coefficients from column 3 in Table 3 and mean values of the
control variables we compute hypothetical counterfactual spot prices for each country.
Table 5. Yearly windfall impacts on consumers from unilateral German energy policies
in e billion/year DE AT FR NL CH DKE DKW PL CZ
Higher costs from the phase-out 3.23 0.44 3.73 0.38 0.19 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.51
Lower costs from increased
German renewables
1.60 0.22 0.58 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.16
Net impact of unilateral policies
on consumers as a whole
1.63 0.22 3.15 0.25 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.35
Source: Authors’ calculations.
24 The coefficient measures the correlation between values in the first and the second row of
Table 4.
25 The huge difference in terms of market integration across countries—for instance between
Poland and the Czech Republic—might be surprising against the background of similar mean pri-
ces for Poland and the Czech Republic. However, the mean price similarity is rather coincidental,
as can be seen in Fig. A.1 in the online Appendix.
26 In discussing the results, where we write of ‘consumers’ we mean both domestic and industrial
consumers, unless we qualify the word. Of note, the costs for German consumers are even higher
than computed in Table 5 since German consumers also have to pay a so called ‘Renewable
Energy Surcharge’ (in German: EEG-Umlage).
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Define the (k by c) matrix X1 where the column vectors are the mean values for all k vari-
ables for country i; i ¼ 1; . . . ; c and the (k by c) matrix bB as the matrix of coefficients on
each of these variables country by country. Then p1 ¼ diag bB 0X1
 
is the (c by 1) vector of
estimated mean prices for each country. Further define X0 as the version of X1 where, coun-
terfactually, the German renewables increases had not happened, and bB0 as the version of
bB if the German nuclear outage had not happened.27 Then calculate pA ¼ diag bB0 0X1
 
;
pB ¼ diag bB10X0
 
and pC ¼ diag bB0 0X0
 
. Define q as the (c by 1) vector of annual loads
for each country. The (transposed) values pA  pCÞ0q; ðpB  pC
 0
q and pA  pBÞ0q

are
listed in Table 5. The output reveals substantial resulting monetary effects. Concentrating
on the respective net impact figures, only Polish consumers, that is those from the least
integrated country included into our study, realize a small net annual gain of about e0.05
billion in the period analysed. Furthermore, we find that while the smaller (rather well inte-
grated) countries in our data set face small (in absolute terms) net impacts, consumers in the
two large countries France and Germany experienced substantial negative net impacts,
notably of e3.15 billion for France.28 One explanation for this is that French domestic con-
sumers use electricity for heating purposes in winter when it benefits less from Germany’s re-
newable expansion due to lower solar generation.29 For instance in 2012 hourly solar
generation in summer was on average 4.96 GWh compared to 0.89 GWh in winter.
In sum, the nuclear phase-out generated extra costs of about e8.7 billion per year for
consumers in Germany and its neighbours, while the promotion of renewables caused
windfall savings of about e2.9 billion yearly in the analysed post-phase-out period.30
With respect to the impact of the policy reforms on electricity producers in neighbouring
countries the opposite is true: the German nuclear phase-out increased electricity prices and
thus producer rents in neighbouring countries whilst the increase of German renewables
reduced foreign prices and thus rents for neighbouring producers. As electricity demand is
rather inelastic—and deadweight losses thus rather small—these policy reforms present
27 The slight differences in the estimates for Germany found here compared to those reported in
Grossi et al. (2017)—focusing on Germany only—result from several differences in the data set
and the estimation method. First, data availability issues constrain us here to the observation
period from 2010 to 2012, while Grossi et al. (2017) include the year 2009 in their analysis. Second,
our estimations here are run on daily data while Grossi et al. (2017) go down to hourly level. Third,
we were unable to include river-related control variables here as they were not consistently avail-
able for all countries. Fourth, we instrument for cross-border congestion while Grossi et al. (2017)
argue it is exogenous in the case of Germany. Last, the estimation approach followed here is
system-wide GMM including all neighbouring countries while Grossi et al. (2017) estimate the ef-
fects for Germany in isolation.
28 We treat Germany and Austria as separate markets here (with an average actual hourly load of
54.85 GWh for Germany and 7.46 GWh for Austria in our observation period).
29 Figure A.2 in the online Appendix illustrates the different load patterns for Germany/Austria and
France.
30 Technically, we measure industry benefits from renewables in Germany here because German
customers have to pay the costs resulting from the difference between the fixed feed-in tariffs for
renewables and the wholesale price, the so-called EEG surcharge, as a part of their electricity
bills. Industry, by contrast, is mainly exempted from paying the EEG surcharge.
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potentially similarly-sized windfall costs and savings between foreign consumers and pro-
ducers. However, it should be noted that, beyond these eventually mostly distributional im-
pacts, unilateral policies are also likely to have an impact on the investment risks for
foreign electricity producers, if they are unexpected.
In sum, the main result of our empirical analysis is that because most central continental
European countries are already highly integrated, unilateral policy reforms have significant
impacts on consumers in neighbouring countries.31 By demonstrating the substantial im-
pact unilateral policy reforms—particularly in large countries—can have on neighbouring
countries in an internal market for electricity, our results raise the question of policy
implications.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
Harmonization and integration of separate national energy markets to an interconnected
internal European market is a top priority for the European Commission, something we do
not question here. However, as energy policy largely remains subject to national sover-
eignty, greater integration means unilateral national policies can impact interconnected
markets. We investigated the impact of two distinct national energy reforms in Germany—
the phase-out of nuclear power plants after the Fukushima incident and the expansion of re-
newables promoted by fixed feed-in tariffs and unlimited priority feed-in—on neighbouring
countries. The phase-out triggered price increases of up to 25% in neighbouring countries
whilst the renewable energy support schemes caused a price decrease of up to 0.16% for
each percent of additional generation from German renewables. Also, in most cases the im-
pact of both policy reforms would have been a little higher in the absence of cross-border
congestion. The range of the identified market integration spans from 16% to 94%.
However, the 16% for Poland is an outlier since the second lowest value in terms of market
integration is 64% (Switzerland). Hence, the goal of a single internal electricity market
with all the benefits such as an increased (and cheaper) security of supply or a power
smoothing and the resulting smoothing in prices is not far away.
From a policy perspective, the externalities of unilateral decision in one Member State
imposed on the others demonstrates the importance of a coordinated approach of
European energy policy in a largely well-integrated European electricity market. This does
not necessarily suggest that all strategic decisions are made on the European level.
However, it requires significant monitoring in order that their costs and implications are
discussed.
Considering the cost implications in more depth, separation into economy-specific, in-
dustry-specific and market-specific perspectives appears feasible. First, from an economy-
specific (macroeconomic) perspective, increasing electricity prices act like a VAT increase
on the one hand and decrease available income for consumers on the other, thereby having
direct impacts on real purchasing power, hence, on industry production and economic
growth in both the originating and the neighbouring countries (see also, Hamilton, 1983;
Mork, 1989; Kilian, 2008; Berk and Yetkiner, 2014; Cox et al., 2014).
Second, from an industry-specific perspective, intensive energy-using firms face substan-
tial absolute increases in costs causing a competitive disadvantage with respect to foreign
31 Analogously, unilateral policy reforms made in a small country likely will have no impact, even in
the implementing country.
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competitors (either less integrated—and therefore less affected by the policy reform—or
located outside Europe). If the respective price increases are permanent and substantial,
unilateral policy reforms in one country may cause firm closures, and even changes in in-
dustry structures, in neighbouring countries, triggering potentially substantial knock-on ef-
fects from social and labour market perspectives, for example.
Third, from a market-specific perspective, unilateral policy reforms have a direct impact
on investment decisions in neighbouring countries. For example, the Net Present Value cal-
culation of an investor considering construction of a French power plant will depend on ex-
pectations regarding neighbours’ unilateral policy reforms, creating uncertainty in addition
to positive or negative price effects. Anticipated lower prices—caused by the promotion of
renewables—will reduce the incentives to invest into construction of a new plant. In any
case, unilateral policy reforms will therefore impact upon the future structure of the
European electricity industry. Potentially, the induced insecurity with respect to expected
return on investments can cause underinvestment and thereby negative externalities on sup-
ply security.
Against this background, it appears to be important to design new rules—or alterna-
tively enforce existing rules—on what types of decisions need debate or even decision at
the Community level before they are actually implemented. Although in this article, we
only provide evidence on the importance of this issue for the case of (parts of) the
European electricity market, the main allocative and distributive impacts of unilateral
national decisions are likely to apply to other policy areas in the European Union as
well—thus suggesting the development and implementation of a comprehensive general
approach that reflects the strategic importance of the issue for the future development of
the European Union.
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